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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3103, ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER TELLS DIPLOMATIC CORPS

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Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06TELAVIV3103**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06TELAVIV3103	2006-08-08 15:06	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tel Aviv

Appears in these articles:

[not](#)
[yet](#)
[set](#)

null
Carol X Weakley 08/11/2006 04:45:55 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley

Cable
Text:

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 03103

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: RES IPSC PD IMO ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO
CONS

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM:GACRETZ
DRAFTED: EXEC:SISKAL
Cleared: POL: NOLSEN

VZCZCTV1731
PP RUEHC RUEHXK RUCNMEM

DE RUEHTV #3103/01 2201506

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 081506Z AUG 06

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5467

INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003103

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016

TAGS: IS LE UNSC PREL MOPS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER TELLS DIPLOMATIC CORPS
ISRAEL MAY NOT ABIDE BY A CEASEFIRE UNLESS BACKED BY FORCE.

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b)
) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an August 7 Diplomatic Corps briefing held in response to public Lebanese efforts to influence the United Nations Security Council, FM Livni told UNSC Ambassadors that Israel may not honor a ceasefire unless it is backed up by a force to stop rearming by Hizballah and expressed clear regret at the international community's unwillingness to put more pressure on the Government of Lebanon. She said the bigger issue for the GOI is how the international community will deal with Hizballah. Looking to the future, Livni asked whether the international community is willing to give a veto to Hizballah. She said the GOI understands the need for an international force but objects to UNIFIL. She stressed that the GOI would not agree to a ceasefire without an international force because otherwise it would lead to a vacuum that a rearmed Hizballah would fill. In a veiled reference to the Shebaa Farms issue, Livni asked the international community to protect its own interests and avoid a UNSCR that would only create more problems in the future. End summary.

"Stating the Obvious"

¶2. (C) Livni began by noting that this is a "complicated situation," and that Israel, Lebanon and the international community are all looking for the "best way out." Stating up front she did not want to debate draft language in any proposed UNSCRs with the group, Livni apologized for "stating the obvious" facts as the GOI sees them: that Israel was attacked unprovoked by Hizballah; that UNSCCRs 425, 1559 and 1680 instructed Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and worked to restore a sovereign Lebanese government; that after the attack, the GOI could have attacked the GOL but understood that the GOL is an achievement of the international community and believes the Siniora government is a step towards a better future for Lebanon. Therefore, the GOI distinguished between the GOL and Hizballah and focused its counterattack on Hizballah (NB: Livni's clear regret at not putting more pressure on the GOL appeared purely emotional as she offered no argument as to why that would have been more effective in this case).

Livni on Israel's Expectations
of the International Community

¶3. (C) Noting that the current situation represents "a kind of test," Livni told the Ambassadors that "perhaps for the first time we're standing with you and waiting for you to do something." Livni explained that the GOI expects the international community will implement its own decisions. "Is there meaning to the UNSC?" she asked, adding that if 1559 had been implemented there would not have been an attack. The GOI acknowledges that Siniora's government is weak, but Livni reiterated the international community needs to have rules for dealing with cases such as the current one. Arguing that "outside pressure can help others make

unpopular decisions," Livni said the international community can best help Siniora by taking decisions without waiting for his approval so that he cannot further delay action.

¶ 14. (C) The bigger issue for the GOI, according to Livni, is whether the international community is willing to give Hizballah a veto. She described Hizballah as "the long arm of Iran," and said that the terrorist organization will use its arms and extremist tactics against the Western world and not just Israel. Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Iran, Syria, and the Muslim Brotherhood are all watching this situation unfold, she said. Livni posed the question, "will the international community take decisive action or choose a path of appeasement?" On UNSCR 1559, Livni said it needs to be implemented without conditions. The idea that the Lebanese are taking advantage of a terrorist attack to seek territory that the UN has pronounced Syrian is unreasonable.

¶ 15. (C) Turning to issues regarding the international force, Livni said the GOI understands that there is a consensus on the need for an international force to assist the "weak" LAF. The GOI is prepared to accept an international force, but only if it is an appropriate force. Livni dismissed UNIFIL as "not the right answer," asserting that UNIFIL has just watched past abduction attempts.

Livni on Abducted Soldiers

¶ 16. (C) Livni said it is "morally right" to call for the release of abducted soldiers. Livni said she could not understand any moral connection between convicts -- including what she described as a brutal murderer detained, tried and convicted legally by the GOI -- and abducted Israeli soldiers kidnapped on Israeli soil.

Livni on Next Steps

¶ 17. (C) Preventing rearmament the day after is key, according to Livni, as the GOI is seeing continuous action on the Syrian/Lebanese border to resupply Hizballah. Therefore an arms embargo under Chapter VII is necessary and forces to enforce it on the border are required urgently. Livni explained that she understands the importance of "sequencing," noting that forming a Chapter VII force takes time. The responsibility, she said, to control the South really belongs to the GOL, but if it needs help, then the force should be formed as soon as possible. She stressed, however, that it must be a real force. The GOI does not want to widen its military operations in South Lebanon, but a ceasefire without a force would lead to a vacuum that a rearmed Hizballah would soon fill, and "we will not agree to it," adding that the sooner steps are taken, the sooner the fighting will stop.

¶ 18. (C) Turning to the UN, Livni questioned the need for two separate resolutions, arguing that the GOI wants real change on the ground. Livni asked ironically whether the international community would be satisfied simply with a statement on a piece of paper or would the international community this time take real steps to rid Southern Lebanon of weapons, dismantle Hizballah, prevent arms, and secure the release of the Israeli soldiers.

¶ 19. (C) Livni concluded by saying that this conflict did not start out as a government-to-government conflict. She asked the international community to protect its own interests and, in a veiled reference to the Shebaa Farms issue, to avoid a UNSCR which would only create more problems in the future. Livni said that "next time Israel will not make a distinction between the Government of Lebanon and Hizballah."

¶ 110. (C) After Livni finished, MFA Deputy DG for International Organizations Roni Ya'ar took the floor briefly to report that Arab countries are trying to raise the current crisis in

the UN's new Human Rights Council and cautioned that if a resolution were passed against Israel then it would complicate current UN efforts. In this regard, he noted that such an effort would be against UN rules since the issue is already before the UNSC.

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JONES